ciphergoth | BBC article on why encryption regs are stupid

There's only one way to stop terrorists using net
Caspar Bowden, BBC, 1 October 2001

The only way to stop terrorist cells communicating via the internet is to disinvent it. Encryption is irrelevant.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_1569000/1569874.stm

I added some comments in the feedback form - I wonder if they'll use any of them?

As a professional cryptographer, and in common with the bulk of the research community, I entirely concur with the bulk of what Bowden says here. The genie is out of the bottle; if you want to put it back in you must burn the routers, tear up the cable, and demolish all the telephone exchanges and mobile masts. Nothing short of this will prevent terrorists using effectively uncrackable encryption to communicate if they so choose; even this probably wouldn't work unless the radio can be uninvented too.

I would argue that it is practical to attack the end points if you're prepared to sneak into their houses. A suspected Mafia boss's use of strong encryption was defeated when the FBI hid a recording device on his keyboard cable. But this is only possible against a few suspected terrorists; it's no good if your aim is to eavesdrop on large segments of the population.

Finally, the much-feared quantum code-breaker is probably impossible to build in practice. Even if it is possible, it is useful only against the more convenient ciphers that the business and financial world relies on; terrorists can easily switch to the slightly less convenient "symmetric" ciphers available and make these machines useless.

Scientific detail on that last comment for those who care: Schrodinger's Cat is both alive and dead, in two quantum "eigenstates" that "collapse" later. Quantum code breakers, if they are feasable, divide a quantum computer into two states which solve two different parts of the problem; these divide again, and again, multiplying the computing power available. But for weird quantum reasons to do with managing the collapse later, they're only useful against "public-key" ciphers; you can defend against them with "secret-key" ciphers simply by doubling your key length. It's easy for terrorists to arrange to share secret keys; it's much harder for businesses and ordinary people.