Date: 2004-11-05 09:34 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] selki.livejournal.com
See http://www.evoting-experts.com/ (http://www.evoting-experts.com/), an e-voting blog, includes a link to this account of an election judge which shows how easy tampering with DREs could be in real-life situations (Timonium, MD): http://avirubin.com/judge2.html (http://avirubin.com/judge2.html)

Also see http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78#breaking (http://www.blackboxvoting.org/):

a request filed in King County, Washington on Sept. 15, following the primary election six weeks ago, uncovered an internal audit log containing a three-hour deletion on election night; “trouble slips” revealing suspicious modem activity; and profound problems with security, including accidental disclosure of critically sensitive remote access information to poll workers, office personnel, and even, in a shocking blunder, to Black Box Voting activists.
[...]
The central servers are installed on unpatched, open Windows computers and use RAS (Remote Access Server) to connect to the voting machines through telephone lines. Since RAS is not adequately protected, anyone in the world, even terrorists, who can figure out the server's phone number can change vote totals without being detected by observers.
The passwords in many locations are easily guessed, and the access phone numbers can be learned through social engineering or war dialing.


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Paul Crowley

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