Hmm. I've been thinking about this, and wondering exactly what it is we mean by self-deceit, because as Eliezer alludes to, actually believing that which we believe to be false is tautologically impossible.
It seems to me that there are two things we're talking about - one is being mistaken about what we believe about ourselves, which seems to be what you're talking about in your bullet points above, and probably what people are doing when they say they're self-decieving. It seems a bit inaccurate to call it self-deceit though, because the point at which the actual deceit is going on doesn't involve one's own volition or awareness, so really it's just being wrong.
The other thing, which I think is more what I was talking about, is also a bit of a misnomer - acting the way you think you would act if you believed differently, which is in a sense deceiving someone else. Although the more I think about this, the more I realise that that isn't actually what I'm doing. (The example in my head is that I act as though I trust people even when I don't, because being trusted makes people want to live up to that, and the cost of not trusting them is often quite low. But actually what I'm doing deciding that the same action is appropriate whether I trust them or not.)
Actually, yes, I think I'm convinced. Would be good to see a top-level post about it though, as the ideas could do with being spread to a wider audience than me noodling in the comments of a month old thread.
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Date: 2009-07-16 10:16 am (UTC)It seems to me that there are two things we're talking about - one is being mistaken about what we believe about ourselves, which seems to be what you're talking about in your bullet points above, and probably what people are doing when they say they're self-decieving. It seems a bit inaccurate to call it self-deceit though, because the point at which the actual deceit is going on doesn't involve one's own volition or awareness, so really it's just being wrong.
The other thing, which I think is more what I was talking about, is also a bit of a misnomer - acting the way you think you would act if you believed differently, which is in a sense deceiving someone else. Although the more I think about this, the more I realise that that isn't actually what I'm doing. (The example in my head is that I act as though I trust people even when I don't, because being trusted makes people want to live up to that, and the cost of not trusting them is often quite low. But actually what I'm doing deciding that the same action is appropriate whether I trust them or not.)
Actually, yes, I think I'm convinced. Would be good to see a top-level post about it though, as the ideas could do with being spread to a wider audience than me noodling in the comments of a month old thread.