No, but don't worry :-) This is a bit imprecise but I'm rushed...
I thought that lizw was making an argument a little like C S Lewis or Plantinga's argument, which both (very, very roughly) start by talking about how certain beliefs resist normal justification and so we can argue that belief in God is as valid as those beliefs.
So the fact that we can't justify the principle of induction through experience is key to that argument, and I couldn't understand how the argument worked without it - I think of a belief justified by experience as a whole different category of belief. I really hadn't expected that anyone would disagree that the principle of induction is in principle unjustifiable, I thought that was a fairly uncontroversial bit of philosophy and in fact one that lizw's arguments depended on.
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Date: 2009-01-08 06:26 pm (UTC)I thought that
So the fact that we can't justify the principle of induction through experience is key to that argument, and I couldn't understand how the argument worked without it - I think of a belief justified by experience as a whole different category of belief. I really hadn't expected that anyone would disagree that the principle of induction is in principle unjustifiable, I thought that was a fairly uncontroversial bit of philosophy and in fact one that