(*) You don't have to hash the entire half a kilobyte - only the changing suffix
(*) You're still not taking multiple target attacks into account
(*) Even setting that aside, on my machine OpenSSL reports
Doing sha1 for 3s on 1024 size blocks: 693215 sha1's in 3.00s
By my sums, that suggests that it could do 2^32 trials in 2.58 hours. So finding a match for a single target will take around 78 minutes. If you have a thousand targets, it will take 4.64 seconds to find a match.
No, I don't plan to implement this attack unless you can find some very surprising reason to think that these sums aren't at least in the right order of magnitude.
It's clear from your answers in any case that you don't understand Zooko's triangle and its implications - please try to engage with that before you return.
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timeasmymeasure
Re: Zooko's triangle
Date: 2007-03-05 03:14 pm (UTC)(*) You're still not taking multiple target attacks into account
(*) Even setting that aside, on my machine OpenSSL reports
Doing sha1 for 3s on 1024 size blocks: 693215 sha1's in 3.00s
By my sums, that suggests that it could do 2^32 trials in 2.58 hours. So finding a match for a single target will take around 78 minutes. If you have a thousand targets, it will take 4.64 seconds to find a match.
No, I don't plan to implement this attack unless you can find some very surprising reason to think that these sums aren't at least in the right order of magnitude.
It's clear from your answers in any case that you don't understand Zooko's triangle and its implications - please try to engage with that before you return.