ciphergoth | Twelve Virtues of Rationality

Twelve Virtues of Rationality

Eliezer S. Yudkowsky, 2006

The first virtue is curiosity. A burning itch to know is higher than a solemn vow to pursue truth. To feel the burning itch of curiosity requires both that you be ignorant, and that you desire to relinquish your ignorance. If in your heart you believe you already know, or if in your heart you do not wish to know, then your questioning will be purposeless and your skills without direction. Curiosity seeks to annihilate itself; there is no curiosity that does not want an answer. The glory of glorious mystery is to be solved, after which it ceases to be mystery. Be wary of those who speak of being open-minded and modestly confess their ignorance. There is a time to confess your ignorance and a time to relinquish your ignorance.

Read on...

I've been absolutely captivated by Yudkowsky's writing on rationality for ages now; it's given me a lot of new tools with which to think about and talk about the world, and shaken me out of a lot of comfortable assumptions about my own rationality. I'd love to know what people who read here think about it.

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Ooh! Interesting piece and I'll look at more of the author's stuff. I like the choice to give up mystery particularly.

Mysterious Answers to Mysterious Questions tackles that whole class of error in more detail.

Good one - stolen.

A lot of it tallies exactly with what I want to do as a (science) teacher, and the qualities I hope to develop in my students (and myself).

I particularly like his clear distinction between blindly accepting different views and evaluating ideas based on evidence. I think this is the trap people fall into when they say that teaching creationism in science lessons is offers a 'balanced perspective' on evolution- and it's a very important one to be aware of.

What are the bits you most disagree with?

I disagree with the bits about total honesty in arguments- to be able to actually apply that depends very much on the context of the argument, and there are many where it's not appropriate. But again I'm probably placing this into the context of education. And it's something I'd keep in the back of my mind, so disagree is perhaps too strong, but I don't wholly agree.

I also find personally that if I start out seeking perfection, I end up being unable to start whatever it is I'd set out to do. Once I've got past the novice stage, I'm able to set higher and higher standards. But there needs to be some sort of satisfaction there, albeit without complacency.

depends very much on the context of the argument

Could you give an example?

if I start out seeking perfection, I end up being unable to start whatever it is I'd set out to do

I think he's referring to a very specific kind of perfectionism to do with not tolerating your own errors of thought. Obviously uncertainty and approximation are to some extent unavoidable facts of life.

Edited 2009-09-22 11:16 (UTC)

That's an interesting style. It's as if he's pitching the pursuit of rationality in the language of mysticism and spirituality. Which would certainly be useful if it attracted some of the folk who follow those paths into following the rational path.

I find it a bit irritating because that sort of dojo/guru style of teaching tends to promote unquestioning acceptance of whatever Sensei says, but on the other hand it does have a way of sticking in the mind...

I like the idea that when we start we don't need to know where we will end up. As in, if you write 'blah' at the bottom of the blank sheet of paper then there is no need to go back and write the rest; if you already knew where you were gong then you would be there already. Too many people think that you have to know the answer before you start. But I like an exercise to be an exploration (by exercise i mean line of thought or experiment)where the results may give illuminating and interesting new directions.

Thaks to this and links off it I ended up spending an entire busride into London reading about Bayesian maths. I thought you'd like to know. :)

WIN!

I followed his writing for a while, but stopped because I found it a bit too long-winded for my taste. What I most liked about it when I was still reading was his knack for metaphor.

It can be at times. You and he definitely see the world quite differently - you differ sharply on your take on mystery AFAICT, for example.

True, but his take makes sense to me and has a certain aesthetic attraction. It certainly wouldn't have stopped me reading him.

I would be fascinated to read your side of the argument on this one. Do you agree that "mystery is a property of questions, not answers"?

Edit: or indeed if there are any other differences with his approach to rationality that you're interested in setting out I'm interested in reading them.

Edited 2009-09-25 15:40 (UTC)

Let me get back to you on this when I have more time.

Okay, since I'm at home with flu today, let me have a go.

"Mystery" isn't a term I use much, so please don't assume I attach any great significance to the views I'm about to set out; I've largely worked them out specifically for the purposes of this discussion, so they aren't particularly settled opinions and may well change.

I think I do agree with Yudkowsky that mystery is a property of questions. I probably wouldn't have phrased it that way myself unprompted; I'd probably go for a Wittgensteinian approach and say that mystery is an artefact of our attempts to construct a coherent worldview, and specifically of the role of language in those attempts. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, some of these "questions" are never going to have answers because it's only the way we have constructed language that makes us think there's a question to ask at all. All language is ultimately analogy and metaphor; we'd be better off looking for better metaphors than for "answers".

I'm not going to address your edit, though I do appreciate the invitation, because I think it's just too big a subject for an LJ discussion. It's more like a PhD thesis, and I know I don't have time or spoons for one of those.

Thanks, that's an enlightening answer.

As you indicate, I meant the edit as an open-ended invitation rather than a challenge - I'm sure that setting out all your differences in detail with close argument would take volumes! I'm sure we'll get the chance to learn more about it in future discussions.

It seems that Yudkowsky's virtues are very inwardly-directed; they all describe ways to relate to oneself, rather than relate to others. If I were feeling charitable, I'd call this solipsism; if not, I'd call it sociopathy. Perhaps Yudkowsky means that rationality, like science, is a morally neutral tool which will help you do whatever you're doing better, even if what you're doing is, well, evil.

But it still bugs me that someone can display each of these virtues perfectly and still be a vile psychopath. I think it bugs me more because of Robin Hanson (http://robinhanson.typepad.com/overcomingbias/2007/08/food-vs-sex-cha.html). Oh, hell, just pick your favorite moment (http://brown-betty.livejournal.com/387154.html). If the virtues of rationality don't make the merest dent in that sort of thing (and, indeed, I forget the name of this metabias, but learning about cognitive biases tends to make the rationalist see them in others but not in themselves)... I don't think that they're utterly useless, but they're not particularly useful, either.

If your program of reasoned self-improvement toward rationalism leads you to propose rape coupons, there may be a flaw in your program of reasoned self-improvement toward rationalism.

Twelve Virtues of Rationality

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The virtues seem rather insular.