Paul Crowley (![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
ciphergoth) wrote2009-01-04 11:34 pm
ciphergoth) wrote2009-01-04 11:34 pm
Entry tags:
George H Smith, "Atheism: The Case Against God"
I've read all four of the recent books by the "four horsemen", and for the most part none have made me feel "yes, this is the book I want to press into the hands of believers". I would like there to be at least one book that I might be able to recommend, and having heard good things about this 1974 book, I ordered it from Amazon on a whim.
It certainly comes a *lot* closer than any of those four. It has a very dry style; there are no witty personal stories, few anecdotes, and only a smattering of historical background. But all four of the horsemen books seem somewhat scattershot in their approach, except perhaps Dennett, whose book seems like not so much an attack on religion as a hastily-repurposed discussion of religion originally intended for an atheist audience. This book is much more bulldozer than scattershot, and methodically dismantles the "sophisticated" defences of religion I actually hear from believers.
Its bulldozer-like nature may be seen in its chapter structure; first, clarify what atheism is and establish that the burden of proof lies with the theist; then tear down obfuscation as a means to confound rational discussion of the issue; demolish the idea that faith and revelation can supplement reason as guides to the truth (discussing and destroying a variety of attempts to defend the idea of faith). Only then are the traditional arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological argument, painstakingly taken apart; and only after that are the negative moral consequences of religion discussed.
There are a few problems. Smith is (or at least was) an Objectivist, and this leads to some sad errors; his defence of the idea of moral facts in Chapter 11 Section 2, for example, is just embarrassing. And it seems a shame to discuss the argument from design without even mentioning evolution; I can see that as a philosopher you want to show that the argument is *inherently* flawed, and of course it is, but it's evolution that robs it of its emotional impact. I still find myself thinking that I may have to write my ultimate book on the subject, but I have quite a few other books I'd have to read first to know if there was a gap in the market, and I can't afford quite that many whims :-)
No argument, no matter how good, can turn the head of someone who is prepared to say in terms that they intend to cling to an idea no matter how much they have to embrace irrationality in order to do so, as many sophisticated believers openly say. But still, when I read the four horsemen books, I felt I knew how believers were going to evade the conclusions they were pushing for, and I would love to know how a serious, philosophically knowledgable believer would go about avoiding the conclusions of this book.
Update: as usual, anonymous comments should be signed to be unscreened.
It certainly comes a *lot* closer than any of those four. It has a very dry style; there are no witty personal stories, few anecdotes, and only a smattering of historical background. But all four of the horsemen books seem somewhat scattershot in their approach, except perhaps Dennett, whose book seems like not so much an attack on religion as a hastily-repurposed discussion of religion originally intended for an atheist audience. This book is much more bulldozer than scattershot, and methodically dismantles the "sophisticated" defences of religion I actually hear from believers.
Its bulldozer-like nature may be seen in its chapter structure; first, clarify what atheism is and establish that the burden of proof lies with the theist; then tear down obfuscation as a means to confound rational discussion of the issue; demolish the idea that faith and revelation can supplement reason as guides to the truth (discussing and destroying a variety of attempts to defend the idea of faith). Only then are the traditional arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological argument, painstakingly taken apart; and only after that are the negative moral consequences of religion discussed.
There are a few problems. Smith is (or at least was) an Objectivist, and this leads to some sad errors; his defence of the idea of moral facts in Chapter 11 Section 2, for example, is just embarrassing. And it seems a shame to discuss the argument from design without even mentioning evolution; I can see that as a philosopher you want to show that the argument is *inherently* flawed, and of course it is, but it's evolution that robs it of its emotional impact. I still find myself thinking that I may have to write my ultimate book on the subject, but I have quite a few other books I'd have to read first to know if there was a gap in the market, and I can't afford quite that many whims :-)
No argument, no matter how good, can turn the head of someone who is prepared to say in terms that they intend to cling to an idea no matter how much they have to embrace irrationality in order to do so, as many sophisticated believers openly say. But still, when I read the four horsemen books, I felt I knew how believers were going to evade the conclusions they were pushing for, and I would love to know how a serious, philosophically knowledgable believer would go about avoiding the conclusions of this book.
Update: as usual, anonymous comments should be signed to be unscreened.
no subject
I'm also unclear as to why you think I would be trying to use it in this argument, given that the question we were discussing was almost exactly the inverse: our question hasn't been "given that God exists, how can we rationally establish foundations for thinking?", but "given what we count as rational foundations for thinking, is it reasonable for Liz to believe that God exists?" I was arguing that the justification I have for believing that God exists is of the same kind as the justification that is available for other foundational philosophical beliefs, such as "other minds exist" and "external objects exist"; so if people can be justified in believing those things, then I am justified in believing that God exists. Given what you say about induction, maybe you'd be content to concede that no-one has justification for those beliefs; if that's the case, then I think we've hit on a more fundamental philosophical difference between us than belief in God, and I'd probably be content to agree to disagree on it for the time being.
no subject
such as "other minds exist" and "external objects exist" interesting! Neither of those are foundational problems to me - I think solipsism and belief in zombies are both meaningless stances.
no subject
Of course I'm trying to convince you - not that God exists, but that I'm justified in believing that he does, which is not the same proposition.
Neither of those are foundational problems to me - I think solipsism and belief in zombies are both meaningless stances.
"A is not a foundational belief" does not follow from "not-A is meaningless"; in fact, I think there may be a good argument that "not-A is meaningless" is practically a sufficient condition for "A is a foundational belief", at least for certain values of A.
no subject
It may or may not be relevant, but when we were discussing this offline the other day, you made a convincing case for those being a different type of axiom problem from the principle of induction. The principle of induction (as I think we all in fact agree) is inherently self-referential and any attempt to justify it assumes that it's true. (Whether or not that makes it inherently unjustifiable depends on one's definition of 'justifable', but that it, I think, a separate issue).
That's not true of the others, so I suspect that
no subject
Ah. Ignore me, I see you're both ahead of me on this one.