Paul Crowley (![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
ciphergoth) wrote2009-01-04 11:34 pm
ciphergoth) wrote2009-01-04 11:34 pm
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George H Smith, "Atheism: The Case Against God"
I've read all four of the recent books by the "four horsemen", and for the most part none have made me feel "yes, this is the book I want to press into the hands of believers". I would like there to be at least one book that I might be able to recommend, and having heard good things about this 1974 book, I ordered it from Amazon on a whim.
It certainly comes a *lot* closer than any of those four. It has a very dry style; there are no witty personal stories, few anecdotes, and only a smattering of historical background. But all four of the horsemen books seem somewhat scattershot in their approach, except perhaps Dennett, whose book seems like not so much an attack on religion as a hastily-repurposed discussion of religion originally intended for an atheist audience. This book is much more bulldozer than scattershot, and methodically dismantles the "sophisticated" defences of religion I actually hear from believers.
Its bulldozer-like nature may be seen in its chapter structure; first, clarify what atheism is and establish that the burden of proof lies with the theist; then tear down obfuscation as a means to confound rational discussion of the issue; demolish the idea that faith and revelation can supplement reason as guides to the truth (discussing and destroying a variety of attempts to defend the idea of faith). Only then are the traditional arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological argument, painstakingly taken apart; and only after that are the negative moral consequences of religion discussed.
There are a few problems. Smith is (or at least was) an Objectivist, and this leads to some sad errors; his defence of the idea of moral facts in Chapter 11 Section 2, for example, is just embarrassing. And it seems a shame to discuss the argument from design without even mentioning evolution; I can see that as a philosopher you want to show that the argument is *inherently* flawed, and of course it is, but it's evolution that robs it of its emotional impact. I still find myself thinking that I may have to write my ultimate book on the subject, but I have quite a few other books I'd have to read first to know if there was a gap in the market, and I can't afford quite that many whims :-)
No argument, no matter how good, can turn the head of someone who is prepared to say in terms that they intend to cling to an idea no matter how much they have to embrace irrationality in order to do so, as many sophisticated believers openly say. But still, when I read the four horsemen books, I felt I knew how believers were going to evade the conclusions they were pushing for, and I would love to know how a serious, philosophically knowledgable believer would go about avoiding the conclusions of this book.
Update: as usual, anonymous comments should be signed to be unscreened.
It certainly comes a *lot* closer than any of those four. It has a very dry style; there are no witty personal stories, few anecdotes, and only a smattering of historical background. But all four of the horsemen books seem somewhat scattershot in their approach, except perhaps Dennett, whose book seems like not so much an attack on religion as a hastily-repurposed discussion of religion originally intended for an atheist audience. This book is much more bulldozer than scattershot, and methodically dismantles the "sophisticated" defences of religion I actually hear from believers.
Its bulldozer-like nature may be seen in its chapter structure; first, clarify what atheism is and establish that the burden of proof lies with the theist; then tear down obfuscation as a means to confound rational discussion of the issue; demolish the idea that faith and revelation can supplement reason as guides to the truth (discussing and destroying a variety of attempts to defend the idea of faith). Only then are the traditional arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological argument, painstakingly taken apart; and only after that are the negative moral consequences of religion discussed.
There are a few problems. Smith is (or at least was) an Objectivist, and this leads to some sad errors; his defence of the idea of moral facts in Chapter 11 Section 2, for example, is just embarrassing. And it seems a shame to discuss the argument from design without even mentioning evolution; I can see that as a philosopher you want to show that the argument is *inherently* flawed, and of course it is, but it's evolution that robs it of its emotional impact. I still find myself thinking that I may have to write my ultimate book on the subject, but I have quite a few other books I'd have to read first to know if there was a gap in the market, and I can't afford quite that many whims :-)
No argument, no matter how good, can turn the head of someone who is prepared to say in terms that they intend to cling to an idea no matter how much they have to embrace irrationality in order to do so, as many sophisticated believers openly say. But still, when I read the four horsemen books, I felt I knew how believers were going to evade the conclusions they were pushing for, and I would love to know how a serious, philosophically knowledgable believer would go about avoiding the conclusions of this book.
Update: as usual, anonymous comments should be signed to be unscreened.
no subject
No, I'm not, because I'm not trying to prove anything. I'm attempting to justify using the principle of induction, but I'm not trying to prove it. Experience tells me it usually works, and that it's a good basis for predicting, say, which way gravity will operate in the next few seconds.
The principle of induction certainly cannot be proved with reference to evidence [1]. Are you using 'justified' synonymously with 'proved'? If so, then your response really doesn't seem like a reply to my comment, since I wasn't talking about proof at all. I was talking about axioms (which, by definition, we accept as given rather than prove), and about the evidence of my experiences (which isn't the same thing as proof, or anything like it in my lexicon).
[1] Nor, as far as I'm aware, can it be proved in any other way; that's the point, surely?
no subject
Your justification of induction seems to be "it has worked in the past" and I don't see how you're avoiding the fact that in order to use that as a justification, you need to start by assuming the principle of induction, so all you end up with is "In my experience, experience is a useful guide", which gets you nowhere.
I had been under the impression that the unfoundedness of the principle of induction was pretty uncontroversial in modern philosophy - am I mistaken?
no subject
It gets me everywhere. I can think of no part of my reasoning process that doesn't start from that basis. That's why it matters to me to use the word 'proof' only when I mean 'proof', and not when I mean 'justification', and why the distinction between the two matters.
OK, accepting that you don't use that as a basis for your reasoning (because, for you, it 'gets you nowhere') ... what do you use? How do you justify any deductions at all, if you can't use the principle of induction? (I know these questions sound rheetorical, but they're not, I'm genuinely interested on what you base your reasoning, because it's increasingly clear that it's a very different process from mine.)
no subject
I'm slightly at a loss - I can't now see how you can't see that your justification of the principle is circular.
no subject
I'm equally at a loss as to why you think I believe it isn't. I know it's circular. I just don't see how that negates me treating it as an experiential axiom.
I say it's based on experience. It doesn't seem to me that that says anything either way about whether or not the justification for it's circular.
And I still can't see what you base your use of it on, if not your experience that it works.
no subject
I don't base my use of it on anything, I just use it, which is why I call it an axiom, and that was the sense of "axiomatic" that I thought you and
no subject
Sorry, this deserved an explicit answer.
I treat it as an axiom, and I consider the circular justification 'good enough' for me to use the principle to try to make sense of the world around me an act accordingly. I accept that it is a circular justification, and acknowledge it as a weakness, but for me it's not a fatal one.
That is, honestly, good enough for me.
Assuming that it's not good enough for you (if it were, then I trust that you would see how I'm avoiding the fact you mention), then may I ask whether you avoid that fact in a different way? Do you use the principle of induction at all in reasoning about the world? If you do, how do you avoid the problem that you see me having with it? If not, what do you use? (See other reply for apologies about asking rhetorical-sounding questions seriously.)