No, we ended up talking about the unjustifiability of induction because I thought your position depended on it!
I think my position probably depends on induction being justifiable, along with other beliefs that are equally foundational!
your beliefs about God are not just a conclusion you've reached after examining the evidence available to you, and therefore subject to reasonable debate like any other evidential conclusion, but (I think) it's evidence you cite in response to the GP objection. What am I getting wrong here?
I think you're probably misremembering my responses to the GP objection. I can recall making two in different discussions. One is that it (and FSM, invisible unicorn and other similar objections) rely on a metaphor which wrongly predisposes people to think of "God" as referring to an entity in space and time and therefore leads to a category error when considering what counts as justification for the belief in God's existence. The other is along the lines of "show me someone who genuinely has the existence of the FSM/GP/invisible unicorn as their most fundamental perception, and I'll probably concede that they are justified in believing in it", which is obviously more flippant because I doubt that such people exist, but still probably true.
no subject
I think my position probably depends on induction being justifiable, along with other beliefs that are equally foundational!
your beliefs about God are not just a conclusion you've reached after examining the evidence available to you, and therefore subject to reasonable debate like any other evidential conclusion, but (I think) it's evidence you cite in response to the GP objection. What am I getting wrong here?
I think you're probably misremembering my responses to the GP objection. I can recall making two in different discussions. One is that it (and FSM, invisible unicorn and other similar objections) rely on a metaphor which wrongly predisposes people to think of "God" as referring to an entity in space and time and therefore leads to a category error when considering what counts as justification for the belief in God's existence. The other is along the lines of "show me someone who genuinely has the existence of the FSM/GP/invisible unicorn as their most fundamental perception, and I'll probably concede that they are justified in believing in it", which is obviously more flippant because I doubt that such people exist, but still probably true.